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Public pension programmes in OECD countries are in difficulties.  With ageing
populations, and declining participation of working age men in  paid work, existing
pension arrangements  are likely to be unsustainable in the future in many of the richer
OECD countries.  Indeed, supporting existing pension commitments, even before the
'baby boom' generation  reaches retirement, has already proved problematic in countries
such as Italy. Some governments  have already  taken steps to tackle  the pension issue but
there is inevitably conflict over who will bear the burden of retrenchment: will it be
current taxpayers, current pensioners, or future generations of taxpayers and pensioners,
perhaps not yet born?
This paper considers several issues. It examines the evidence as to whether public
pension programmes  in some richer OECD countries are indeed in need of major surgery,
focusing in particular on  the  issue  of  fiscal sustainability.  It  then  considers why
programmes have got into financial difficulties.  Consideration of this  issue provides
some clues as to what type of reform process is likely to be viable and credible.  The
paper then examines the strengths and weaknesses of some reform strategies. A central
issue considered  there is whether pension programmes should  be funded or unfunded.OECD public  pension  programmes  in cnsis:
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Richard  Disney
1.  Introduction
Public pension programmes in  OECD  countries are in  difficulties. With ageing
populations, and declining  participation  of working age men in paid work, existing  pension
arrangements  are likely to  be unsustainable in the  future in many of the richer OECD
countries.  Indeed, supporting existing  pension comnmitments,  even before the 'baby boom'
generation  reaches  retirement,  has already  proved problematic  in countries  such as Italy. Some
governments  have already  taken steps  to tackle  the pension issue  but there is inevitably  conflict
over who will  bear the burden of retrenchment:  will  it be current  taxpayers,  current pensioners,
or future generations  of taxpayers  and pensioners,  perhaps not yet born?
There are also major differences in philosophy over the nature of pension reforms,
both as proposed and implemented. Blueprints exist for what pension schemes  should look
like, such as the framework  provided by the World Bank.'  But many OECD countries  face
substantial  trnsiion problems  in attempting  to move from existing  arrangements  to what might
be  optimal in the future and have in practice followed a variety of different paths.  An
interesting  question is whether economic  theory gives any guide as to which type of reform
will  succeed. It may be however that countries  are too idiosyncratic  in their existing  systems
and in their political  structure  as to permit a common approach  to reform.
This paper considers several issues. It  examines  the evidence  as to whether public
pension programmes in some richer OECD countries are indeed in need of major surgery,
focusing in particular  on the issue of fiscal sustainability.  It then considers  why programmes
See  World Bank (1994)  and Holzmann (1998a).
3have  got  into financial  difficulties.  Consideration  of this issue  provides  some  clues  as to what
type of reform  process  is likely  to be viable  and credible. The paper then exarmines  the
strengths  and weaknesses  of some  reform strategies.  A central  issue considered  there is
whether  pension  programmes  should  be funded  or unfunded.
A aa  on coverage  of OECD countries  should  also be noted. After  1994,  with the
advent  of Mexico  (1994),  the Czech  Republic  (1995),  Hungary,  Poland  and Korea (1996)  as
OECD  members,  the diversity  of pension  programmes  within  the organisation  has increased
substantially.  Since  the problems  of pension  systems  in transition  econormies,  and  the Latin
American  and East Asian approaches  to pension  reform, are somewhat  different,  these
countries  are covered  separately  in the Pension  Reform  Primer  series. 2 There  is also  a lack  of
published  data for Turkey,  although  its pension schemes  in  fact share many of  the
characteristics  of other  Mediterranean  countries.  The focus  here  is therefore  on the relatively
homogeneous  group  of richer  OECD  member  states.'
2.  The problem  of financing  pension  schemes  in OECD countries
The problem  in the richer  OECD countries  is largely  one of financing  puN5k  pension
programmes:  defined  as their contribution-based  universal  scherme  of provision  of public
benefits  for the elderly  (social  security'  in US  parlance).  These  public  pension  programmes  are
largely  uomdaia 3 Pension  payments  are made from current  contributions,  usually  levied  as
payroUl  taxes,  but sometimes  paid directly  out of general  revenues. 4 Future obligations  are
conditioned  on current  rules  concerning  eligibility  and accrual  rates  and, it is hoped,  will  be
met by future  generations  of contributors.  Prospects  for private,  largelyfwolt,  schemes  are
considered  in the next  section.
2  Grandolini  and  Cerda  (1998)  on  Mexico,  Palacios  and  Rocha  (1998)  on  Hungary,  and  Chlion,  Gora  and
Rutkowski  (1999)  on  Poland.  Surveys  of  pension  reform  in  Eastern  Europe/Central  Asia  and  East  Asia  are  also
in  preparation.
3  Some  of  these  public  programmes  are  'partially  funded'  in  that  a publicy  managed  reserve  has  been  built
up. See  Iglesias  and  Palacios  (1999).
4  A  subsidiary  debate  therefore  concerns  whether  public  pension  programmes  should  be  financed  by  an
earmarked  'insurance'  contribution,  so emphasising  the 'aauarial  basis'  of the  progrmme,  or out  of general
taxation,  implicitly  giving  weight  to the  redistributive  aspect.  There  is also  the  implicit  issue  of the  transparency
of  a contribution-based  scheme  relative  to  a tax-financed  scheme.  Note  that  some  countnes,  such  as  France  and
the  Netherlands,  have  recently  moved  to  broaden  the  base  for  financing  benefits.  Others,  such  as  Australia,  have
always  financed  public  benefits  from  general  revenues.
4A number of projections have been made by international  institutions and individual
governments  of the future liabilities  of public  pension programmes  and of the consequences  of
these liabilities  for fiscal balances. Such projections rely on assumptions  that are not always
explicit  and, on past evidence,  are subject  to large  errors once outcomes are observed. On the
'over-pessimistic'  side, projections often ignore policy feedback mechanisms, which have
tended in the past to impose restraints on the growth of liabilities  of programmes. On the
'over-optimistic' side,  countries have  generally been  systematically  too  optimnistic  in
understating longevity  improvements  and overstating  the labour force participation  of older
workers.  In addition, different projections seem to rank different OECD countries quite
differently  in terns  of the financing  'crises'  associated  with pension programmes.
Table 1 presents some recent projections  from OECD itself for a range of countries.
Column (2) is a memo item, showing  that there is a fair degree of uniformity in ages of
entitlement for a full public pension across countries, although there are some interesting
outliers  such as Japan, Italy and New Zealand  on the one hand, and the Scandinavian  countries
on the other. However it should be noted that official  pension ages give litde guide  to cross-
country variations  in retirement behaviour. Many countries,  including  the United States but
not the United Kingdom, have explicit  actuarially  favourable  early retirement options within
the public pension programrne. A number of countries  bordering  the Mediterranean  also have
or have had devices such as 'seniority  pensions', which allow  individuals  to retire on a full
pension after a certain  number of years'  service,  whether or not they have reached the official
state pension age.' In contrast, in the countries of  northern Europe, retirement through
disability  benefit schemes and other special early retirement 'windows' (within the public
programme)  have been popular,  especially  in periods  of recession.
The remaining columns are derived from an  OECD-based simulation model of
pension liabilities  for individual  countries. The underlying  procedure is standard: it projects
earnings  growth based on an aggregate  model of earnings,  utilises existing  contribution rates
and projects benefit 'rules' (taking  account of any prospective  reforms) in order to calculate
S  For example,  in Italy,  untl the recent reforn, 35 years of contributions  would automatically  entitle an
individual  to a full  pension; however  public  servants  could originally  receive  a full pension after 20 years' service.
In Turkey,  25 years of contribution  would entitle  the individual  to a full  pension as would being 55 (a  man) or 50
(a  woman). In Greece,  there is a complicated  formula  linking  days  of contributions  to first age of receipt,  but men
could in principle  retire at 58 and women at 50.
5future pension liabilities  and contribution  receipts. Participation  rates are held constant in the
OECD case,  where it is also assumed  that the age-earnings  profiles,  presumably  derived  from
cross sections,  are 'augmented'  by 1  12  per cent annual productivity  growth and where GDP
growth  is assumed  to be on a 'medium  termn  growth path'. These assumptions  are sufficient  to
calculate  columns  (3)  and (4),  which show the cost of public  pensions as a proportion  of GDP
and the present value of the difference between projected benefits and currently legislated
contribution  revenues,  to the time horizon of 2070.6
It should  be noted in passing  that there is not a close correlation  between  the current
GDP cost of pension provision and the ratio of the population of 65 and over to the working
population (the 'aged dependency  ratio' - ADR); see Figure 1.  In 1990, for example,  the
highest  dependency  ratios,  in descending  order, among  the countries  cited here for which there
are data were Sweden,  Norway, the United Kingdom and Denmark.  Yet three of these
countries  are arnong  the lowest  in terms of pension payments  as a proportion of GDP in 1995.
This  result is due to a combination  of lower benefit  levels,  higher effective  retirement  ages  and
price indexation  of pensions. Of course, given the simulation  methodology,  the increase  im
public  pension payments  to 2030  will be much  more closely  related  to demographic  change. It
is therefore  no surpn'se  to see countries  where the demographic  transition  to an aged society  is
dramatic,  such as Italy,  Japan and the Netherlands,  exhibiting  rising  ratios. It is hard to know
what is an acceptable  upper limnit  on pension payments as a proportion of GDP and it will
partly depend  on the country-specific  demographic  transition. If, however,  as a rule of thumb,
we were to believe  that a 10 per cent ratio of public pension payments  to GDP should be an
effective  ceiling  on public pension commitments,  then some countries already exceed this
fraction,  and many  more wil do so by 2030.
6  This  is the tenninal  date  chosen  by  OECD.
6Figure 1. Aged dependency ratio and public pension payments  as a
percentage  of GDP, 1990-95
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Column (4) indicates starkly that pension contributions will have to rise if large deficits
are not to be incurred.  Government  actuaries in fact, often automatically project contribution
increases in  order  to  ensure  that  there  is  no  projected  deficit.  Whether  such projected
contribution increases are irnplemented in all countries is quite a different matter, and already
in several countries existing pension commitments  are being partly funded by borrowing.
7Table 1. OECD Estimates  of financial liabilities  of public pension programmes 1995-2030
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Country  Standard  age  of  Public  pension  Present  value  of  Net  financial  liabilities, Increase  in tax/GDP
Entitlement  to pension  payments,  % of GDP  contributions  less  % of GDP  ratio  required  to keep
(men/women)  1995  2030  pension  spending,  1995  2030  net  debt  constant
% of GDP  2005  2030
United  States  65  65  4.1  6.6  -23.0  51  95  -0.3  5.3
Japan  60  58  6.6  13.4  -70.0  11  317  3.5  9.6
Germany  65  65  11.1  16.5  -61.6  44  216  2.8  9.7
France  60  60  10.6  13.5  -102.1  35  165  0.8  7.1
Italy  60  55  13.3  20.3  -59.7  109  234  1.8  11.4
United  Kingdom  65  60  4.5  5.5  -23.8  40  137  1.7  3.5
Canada  65  65  5.2  9.0  -100.7  70  -27  -3.2  3.6
Australia  65  60  2.6  3.8  -96.7  28  10  -1.3  2.4
Austria  65  60  8.8  14.4  -92.5  50  317  3.8  15.4
Belgium  65  60  10.4  13.9  -152.6  128  77  -2.0  5.9
Denmark  67  67  6.8  10.9  -234.5  46  34  -1.9  3.8
Finland  65  65  10.1  17.8  -64.8  -7  98  -1.4  8.8
Greece  65  60  ..  ..  ..  ..
Iceland  67  67  2.5  4.2  -66.2  35  69  -0.3  4.3
Ireland  66  66  3.6  2.8  -17.8  86  83  -0.3  1.8
Luxembourg  65  65  ..  ..
Netherlands  65  65  6.0  11.2  -53.3  43  185  0.8  9.0
New  Zealand  61  61  5.9  8.3  -212.8  ..
Norway  67  67  5.2  10.9  -124.1  -26  -57  -2.7  3.8
Portugal  65  62  7.1  13.0  -109.2  71  170  0.5  8.2
Spain  65  65  10.0  14.1  -108.6  50  159  0.9  7.4
Sweden  65  65  11.8  15.0  -132.3  28  78  -0.6  4.0
Switzerland  65  62
Key.  Column  2:  standard  age  of  first  entitlement  to  state  pension,  in 1992
Source:  Column  2,  4 and  6: OECD  (1996),  Tables  2.3  and  5.3;  column  3: OECD  (1998a);  columns  3-6,  Roseveare  et at.  (1996),  Tables  1, 3 and  6.
Notes: Column  4: the net  present  value  of employer  and  employee  contributions  to 2070,  net  of future  pension  liabilities  and  less  existing  assets,
as percentage  of 1994  GDP. Assumes  annual  productivity  growth  of 1.5  per cent and discount  rate of 5 per cent. Column  5: existing
revenues  and expenditures  held constant  as a proportion  of GDP. Scenario  in (3) and (4) for pension  expenditure. Health  care costs
assumed  to  grow in line  with  GDP  but  health  care  cost-age  ratio  maintained  as at present.  Net interest  payments  are  then added  and  the
real  interest  rate  is assumed  to reflect  (and  track)  GDP  growth.
8Given the pension calculations,  the next stage in such calculations  is to take the
existing  fiscal  stance and to factor in the extra pension expenditures  to examnine  future 'net
financial  liabilities',  so as to project the future overall fiscal  balance. These  will look larger,
of course, if the budget is already  in deficit. The calculations  in columnn  (5) also include  the
projected  costs of health care. They assume  that underlying  health costs will  rise  in line with
GDP (despite  the fact that in most countries  they have risen considerably  faster in recent
years) and adjust le&s  of health care costs to the evolving  demographic  profile (since  the
very  young and the elderly  tend to incur more health expenditures  than other age  groups).'
These numbers, accompanied  by those in column (6), are those that give  politicians
and central  bankers heart attacks. Projected increases  in financial  liabilities  in countries  such
as Austria,  Japan, Italy and Germany look alarming,  and increases in contribution/GDP
ratios,  to levels  as high as 10-15  per cent by 2030,  are not seen as electoral  vote  winners. An
important catit,  however, is that we have little mneans  of judging  the reliability  of such
projections.  For example,  Canada,  although it has recently  implemented  a pension reform,
has a rapidly rising cost of health care and one of the most rapid demographic  transitions
among these countries,  yet it is shown as having an inprovement in its financial  position
over the period. Vanrations  in the range of projections  based on alternative  assumptions  as
to demographic  and economic  variables of course 'fan out' as we project further into the
future.
As a check on these numbers, Table 2 contains some comparable  simulations  from
the  ME. Countries  are ranked from the highest net pension liability  to the lowest. These
figures do not allow for the additional  costs of health care. They are calculated  on similar
assumptions  to those of the OECD study,  with ll½ per cent productivity  growth. Although
there appears to be no explicit  attempt to model the evolution of wages,  the simulations
appear to allow  for cohort-specific  variation  in labour force participation  rates. The basic
message  of Table 2 is similar  to that of Table 1, but there are important country-specific
differences.  The increases  in debt liabilities  are not as dramatic  as in the OECD calculations,
perhaps  because  additional  health care expenditures  are ignored. It is also noticeable  that the
7  An important  issue  is whether  increased  longevity  is associated  with  better  health  (i.e.  a reduction  in
morbidity).  There  is some  evidence  that age-specific  morbidity  rates  have  dedined,  but future  progress  wMil
depend  on medical  advances.
9IMF method of calculation  places a heavy emphasis on cw'ret fiscal stance. For example,
Italy is shown to  have a positive primary balance in  1995 and thus the net adjustment
required appears to be much lower than, say Sweden (in contrast to Table 1, and common
sense).
Table  2. Net pension  liabilities  and  sustainability  of fiscal  stance
per  cent  of  GDP  Net  public  Net  pension  Combined  net  Primary  Primary  balance  needed  to:  Adjustment  in
debt  liability  debt  liability  balance  Stabilise  net  debt  Stabilise  long-run  Primary  balance
(1994)  (1995-2050)  (1995)  in 1995  net  debt  forstability
France  42  114  156  -0.3  0.7  4.0  4.3
Germany  53  111  163  2.4  1.1  4,5  2.1
Japan  33  107  140  -0.2  0.3  3.6  3.8
Italy  113  76  188  3.3  2.1  4.6  1.3
Canada  72  68  139  0.2  2.7  4.7  4.5
United  States  63  26  89  0.4  1.1  1.9  1.5
Sweden  55  20  75  -5.1  0.1  1.0  6.1
United  Kingdom  38  5  42  0.4  0.7  0.8  0.4
Source:  Chand  and  Jaeger  (1996),  Table  8
A further reservation concerning  financial  simulations  of this type is that they make
only lirnited attempts to  model the underlying  economic structure.  Increases in financial
liabilities  are typically  assumed to raise  real interest rates, but there is litde attempt to model
the impact of this increase  on the capital  stock. In addition,  the underlying  determinants  of
the capital stock and labour productivity may in turn be related to the structure of the
working population and the savings  rate. The most obvious  feedback  mechanism  is that the
age structure affects the aggregate  saving rate, which in tum  affects the rate of capital
accumulation  and thus output growth. Models that embody  life cycle  relationships of this
kind have been constructed, but it is generally  hard in GE-type model simulations also to
calibrate the country-specific  complexities  of pension accruals and contribution structures
across cohorts.'
Whatever  the limitations  of the modelling  procedures,  Tables 1 and 2 convey  a clear
picture of growing  fiscal  imbalances  and implicit  liabilities  that are not usually  transparent in
8  For dynamic  GE models  of this type,  see, for example,  Auerbach  and Kotlikoff  (1987). See  also
Cutler etal (1990). For the United  Kingdom in particular see Mles  (1998,  1999).
10national accounts data. 9 For some countries, these prospective liabilities  look quite alarming.
How then did public pension programmes get into this position? Is, it, for example, simply a
consequence of the ageing of the OECD  population?  The next section suggests that this is
not the only, or indeed the primary, factor.
3.  Why have pension liabilities got out of control in so many OECD countries?
3.1  7he  denograpi  tsition
The standard  explanation  for the rise in financial  liabilities  of pension programmes  is
the ageing of the OECD population.  Table Al  at the end of the paper provides three
measures of dependency for most OECD countries.  First, the aged dependency ratio
(ADR), as discussed  previously. Secondly,  the total dependency  ratio (MDR),  which also
includes  children aged  0-14. Finally,  the 'needs weighted  support ratio' suggested  by Cutler
a  al (1990), which takes account of the fact that  the resources spent on an elderly  person
may differ  from those spent on a child.
All countries, with the exception of Ireland, saw a rise in the ADR between 1960 and
1990 and  all countries, including Ireland, exhibit further ageing until 2030.  However total
dependency ratios, when children  are included, generally  declined  between 1960 and 1990
although  they will  rise between 1990  and 2030. A mixed  picture is observed in terms of the
adjusted support ratio (where a decline in the ratio indicates a deterioration).  A few
countries  saw a sharp  rise from 1960  to 1990,  such as Canada  and Iceland,  because  of the fall
in the share of children  in the population. However,  many see double digit declines in the
ratio in the 1990-2030  period.
Do these changes  in dependency  and support ratios tell us anything  the growth of
pension commitments,  and of future pension liabilities?  Figure 1 provides a simple scatter
plot of the share of public  pension payments  in GDP in 1995  against  the ADR in 1990. The
polynomial  drawn through the points indicates  a weak positive relationship  but there is a
good deal of variability  in the pension burden relative  to the ADR that is unexplained  by
9  At the risk  of relying  on anecdotal  evidence,  in a mniddle-income  country  visited  by the author  on a
World Bank mission,  published  financial  statistics  contained  figures  of contribution  revenues  that were
obtained  by calculating  notional  employee  and  employer  contribution  liabilities.  In practice,  actual  contribution
receipts  were,  in one  scheme,  only  20%  of these  liabilities,  and  many  state  managed  enterprises  (SMEs)  had  not
paid  employee  or employer  contributions  to the central  exchequer  for  years.
11demographic  structure. Ageing does not seem to be the sole explanation  of which countries
have accumulated  larger  pension obligations  through their public  pension programmnes.
It might be expected that a stronger (negative)  relationship would be observed
between  future financial  liabilities  and projected  changes  in the weighted  support ratio, since
demographic  trends are a key factor  underpinning  the simulated  pension obligations. Figure
2 cross-plots the  OECD projections of the absolute increase in  net financial liabilities
between 1995  and 2030  on the IBRD/World Bank estimnated  changes  in the needs-weighted
support ratio from 1990  to 2030. As suggested,  there appears  to be a negative  relationship.
However, as the labelling illustrates,  this is driven by three countries: Ireland with an
improvement in the support ratio and no growth in pension liabilities  and, on the other
hand, Japan and, to a lesser extent, Finland,  where a rapid deterioration  in the support ratio
is associated  with a rapid rise in financial  liabilities. For the remaining countries, large
differences in the demographic  projections are associated with  a wide variation in the
financial trajectory: ageing  per  se does not explain the cross-country variation in current
pension progranmme  commitments  and the future deterioration  of the fiscal  positions.'"
Figure 2.  Change in aged dependency ratio and change in pension
liabilities, 1995-2030
Ireand  change  in  pension  liabilites
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A more sophisticated approach  might be to break down the  changes into the support  ratio into the
impact of fertility (size of the cohort entering the labour market), longevity and labour force participation.
123.2  7he  eay  stages  of WOfoPdsipon  pvrlgrxVw
For  an  augmented  explanation of  the  detenroration of the  fiscal status  of public
pension programmes up  to  the present  time, we have  to  look  at other factors.  'Te  first
explanation  lies in  the  initial  development  of  programmnes. Although  many  countries,
especially in Europe  and Latin America, developed public pension programmes in the inter-
war period, the full introduction  of comprehensive  and universal social security took place
after  1945.  In the  life cycle' of public pension programmes  (as described in The World
Bank, 1994,  315-317), the early years of schemes should be the years in which contributions
are accumulated, assuming that  pension  entitlement is based  on  contributions rather  than
financed by transfers from the general budget  'Sound' actuarial practice involves the initial
accumulation of a fund, to be dissolved at the maturation  of the scheme, even in a scheme
which in 'steady state' will be unfunded, in order to avoid rapid rises in contribution  rates as
the scheme reaches maturity.  Given, too,  that the  first 'full' members of the contributory
scheme  were members  of  a large  'baby boom'  generation,  simple foresight would  have
strengthened this policy condusion to avoid the simultaneous consequences for contribution
rates of both programmne  maturation and population ageing.
Although some public pension programmes did initially accumulate funds, and some
of these  remain, notably the  US Social Security Trust  Fund,  foresight played little part in
pension policy from the start.  Initial trust funds either lost their real value through dubious
investment decisions, or were invested in government securities, so acting as a cheap source
of  public  credit,  or  were  used  to  finance  higher  real  pension  commitments.  Many
govenmments decide  to  pay  benefits  out  of  the  system  to  existing  people  reaching
pensionable age even though  such people had paid litde or nothing in to  the  programme.
Such intergenerational redistribution could be justified on welfare grounds: the  recipients of
such  generosity had,  after  all, lived  through  two  world  wars  and  a  cataclysmic world
recession.  However, such policies destroyed  any notional link between contributions  and
pension payments across generations, and thus any form of fiscal responsibility within the
programmes.
133.3  Falling  lawrfobn  part  nof older  mnu
A pervasive and well-known trend  across OECD  countries has been the decline in
labour force participation of older men below normal state pension ages.  (Ihis  is illustrated
in OECD,  1996, Charts  4.1 and 4.2)."  Current  employment rates for  men aged 60-64 are
under  20 per cent in France  and the Netherlands,  around a third in Italy and Germany, and
around  half in Australia, New  Zealand, the United  Kingdom and the United  States. Japan
has the most 60-64 year olds in jobs: around three-quarters.  The implications of this for the
support  ratio have  been  concealed in many countries  by a rise in the  participation in paid
work of married women.  While participation after state pensionable  age is declining largely
as a  result  of pension  programmes  themselves,  employer and  governnent  policies have
encouraged the decline with disability progranmmes,  relaxing job-search conditions for receipt
of  unemployment  benefit,  'seniority pensions'  (described previously)  and  various  other
'special measures'  (OECD,  1995).  For  example, a quarter of  60-64 year old men  in the
Netherlands and the United  Kingdom receive disability benefits.
3.4  Forge  onrs
A  somewhat  surprising  occurrence is that  many governments  have  systematically
underpredicted  improvernents in longevity and overpredicted future fertility rates.  It is not
clear whether these errors arise as a result of incompetence or are politically motivated.  For
example, many projections  of  fertility rates tend  to  predict  future stabilisation at  close to
replacement  levels even  when  current rates  are  declining.  There  is also a  reluctance to
project  longevity increases to  continue  at their  current rate.  For  example, projecting the
current decline in age-related mortality rates in the United  States would suggest an average
length of life of 85+ years by the middle of the  21't century.  But the  US Social Security
Administration  forecasts  average life expectancy  at  only  81  years in  the  mniddle of  the
century, anticipating that  age-related mortality improvements  will slow considerably in the
next few years. In contrast, other analysts have suggested improvements in life expectancy to
accelerate, perhaps  generating expected longevity of 100 years, over the  same period  (the
evidence is summarised  by Lee and  Skinner, 1999).  Such  projections  of  rapid longevity
improvement  seem to  be regarded  as too  'radical'  by official actuaries, who  adopt  rather
For the United Kingdom,  see Disney etal  (1994)  and Tanner (1998).
14conservative  assumptions.  But of course, what is 'conservative'  to the official  actuary  may
prove wildly overoptirmistic  from the point of view of the future fiscal sustainability  of
pension and health system  if 'radical'  projections  turn out to be correct.
In terms of consequences  for pension reforn of misleading  or omitted  demographic
projections,  the past example  of the United Kingdom is interesting,  although  it should be
emphasised that  I  select this  case merely on  the grounds of proximity and particular
knowledge.  Unlike most  other OECD  countries, the United Kingdom has broadly
maintained  a scheme of flat benefits  since 1946,  supplemented  by private pension schemes.
In 1978,  however,  after a long political  wrangle,  the State Earnings  Related  Pension Scheme
(SERPS) was  introduced, to  provide a  comprehensive earnings-related pension for
individuals  who did not  belong to private occupational schemes.  Government Actuary
projections of the additional  costs of SERPS  were only extended to the year 2005 when,
with the 'baby-boom'  generation  yet to retire,  the miore  generous  scheme  looked affordable.
Subsequent  projections by Hemming  and Kay (1982)  and the Department  of Social  Security
(1984)  however  took the forecast  up to the year 2025,  at which point it became  apparent  that
the scheme would cost a large amount of additional  money. For example,  with earnings
indexation of the basic state pension, the DSS projected the  combined employee  and
employer  contribution  rate to rise from 15.9  per cent in 1985  to 23.2  per cent in 2025 as the
scheme matured and the 'baby boom' generation  retired. These findings  played  a large part
in the subsequent  policies of downgrading  SERPS benefits and encouraging  individuals  to
opt out of SERPS  by buying  personal  pensions  (Disney  and Whitehouse,  1992).
It is remarkable  enough that a major pension programme  was introduced  without a
proper assessment  of the costs of the scheme  either at its own maturity  or at the maturation
of the demographic  transition. What is equally  interesting  is that, since  that time, the official
forecast of the number of retirement pensioners  in  the early  part of the next century has
steadily  risen, even  norrnalising  for changes  in the benefit regime  since  then. For example,  in
1981,  the number of retirement  pensioners  forecast for the year 2020  was 10.6  milion.  By
1990,  the forecast  had risen to 13.4  million. By 1995 (ignoring  the equalisation  of pension
ages for men and women during the decade 2010 to 2020, which is projected to reduce
numbers by 2 million,  in order to keep the calculations  on a comparable  basis),  the figure
15had risen to  14.4 million; an increase of 36 per cent.' 2 Thus, had SERPS continued at its
existing  level of generosity,  the required contribution rate at scheme maturity might now be
projected to be as high as 31.5 per cent, not 23.2 per cent! For a country that had prided
itself on avoiding  the 'excess'  commitments of other OECD countries, this episode was a
salutary  lesson.
3.5  7he Tonzz  Game'natofur4  esxoiasewy
The past and projected build up of the financial liabilities  of the public pension
programme has in large part depended on the political process underpinning the accrual  of
pension commitments  by successive  generations. To examine  this factor in general terms, it
is useful to  start by considering the economic analysis that is normally applied to  the
problem of how to finance  public pension schemes.
A good deal of analysis  of the relative  merits of funded and unfunded social  security
has rested on the scheme satisfying  the so-called  'Aaron-Samuelson'  condition, named after
seminal articles  by Aaron (1966)  and Samuelson  (1958). Samuelson  considered an economy
where goods were perishable and where people sought to retire from producing their own
consumption goods later in life. His point was that individual  lifetime  utility could be
maximised  if a 'social  contract'  could be arranged,  so that each generation  paid a 'pension' to
each preceding generation,  such that the implicit  return on the contract was equal to the rate
of population growth.  Since the  return on  stonrng  perishable goods was negative and
population growth was likely  to be positive, such an 'unfunded' scheme could be socially
optimal.  Aaron's generalisation  of this 'rule' linked the equilibrium 'return' on unfunded
social security  to the rate of growth of earnings,  being the sum of earnings  growth per head
and the growth of population. The mechanical  application  of the 'condition', in a world with
capital,  would simply  compare  the rate of return on capital (the return on a funded scheme)
with the return on an unfunded scheme, as derived above. Where the latter was high, an
unfunded scheme  was superior  to each generation  simply  relying  on its own saving.
Samuelson's  paper bears careful  re-reading,  not least where he discusses  the issue of
how such a 'social contract' can be maintained. It is extremely  hard to think of practical
12  These  projections  are  taken  from the successive  Quinquennial  Reviews  of the Govemrnment  Actuary's
Department.  The  original  costings  for SERPS  are contained  in  the Report  by  the Government  Actuary  on the
16mechanisms by which such contracts can be replicated and implemented  by successive
generations,  without imposing  assumptions  about the nature of transactions  costs (Esteban
and Sakovics,  1993),  or the behaviour  of agents  (Hansson  and Stuart,  1989). The key point
of unfunded social security is that the  financing of accruing liabilities  is left to  future
generations. In that case,  it bears much the same  character  as the schemes  of Charles  Ponzi,
an originator  of the use of chain  letters  to raise  money." 3
In particular,  if the initial  generation  in an unfunded scheme  obtains a 'retum' on its
contributions in excess  of the Aaron-Samuelson  'rule', later generations  will have to accept
lower returns to preserve the stability  of the scheme.  But it is tempting for subsequent
generations  to attempt  to maintain  the high initial  rates  of return  by legislating  over-generous
benefit accruals for themselves, the liabilities  for which will in turn  be passed on  to
subsequent  generations. The only constraint  on this ratcheting  up of programme  liabilities  is
where a  generation believes  that  a subsequent generation  will simply renege on future
commitments  made by a prior generation.  Ageing,  by making  such  reneging  behaviour  more
likely  given  the extra burden  it imposes  on workers,  may  actually  make  pension reform more
likely.' 4
There is a parallel  in all this with the 'initial  conditions'  problem in the public  choice
literature. This suggests  that 'excessive'  government  spending  levels  will be passed on from
generation  to generation,  unless  there are credible  mechanisms  to forestall  the build-up of
public comrnmitments.  These mechanisms  might include 'balanced  budget' policy rules, tax
ceilings  or money  supply  controls. It is, however,  hard to think of rules of this kind that can
induce consistent  behaviour  in unfunded public  pension programmes. Thus, differences  im
the build-up  of pension obligations  in unfunded schemes  across  countries  largely  reflect  the
presence or absence of mechanisms  that enforce constraints  on this short run optimising
behaviour." 5
financial  provisions  of  the  1975  bill  to introduce  SERPS.
13  See  Blanchard  and  Fischer  (1989),  note  23,  p. 84.
14  For  an  extended  argument  along  these  lines,  and  numerical  illustrations,  see  Disney  (1996),  Chapter  9.
i5  For  example,  election  platfonms  in some  countries  often  include  prormises  to increase  the  generosity
of benefit  levels,  lower  the  retirement  age,  and  so  on. These  promises  take  litte  account  of the future  extra
liabilities  incurred  by  such  promises,  which  are  rarely  explicit  in national  accounts.  A natural  requirement  to
inform  public  debate  would  be to require  that  all  reform  proposals  contained  explicit  accounts  of  their  impact
on future  liabilities,  and  of  tJe  raticnal  inidn of  sd  igs
174.  Disparities in private provision
Significant  private provision of pensions, which is the main alternative vehicle of
retirement income provision to public unfunded schemes, is not  a universal rule among
richer OECD countries. Examining  the current and future potential importance of private
pensions, there are two relevant questions.  First, how large should private assets be to
sustain similar  levels of pension in retirement to those promised by unfunded programmes?
Secondly,  are funded programmes largely immunised from the demographic and political
pressures  facing  unfunded public schemes?
Table 3, drawn from OECD (1998a),  provides details of private pension assets as a
percentage  of GDP for a number of countries. What fraction of GDP these assets should
be  to  permit  a  'substantial' private  component  to  retirement  income  depends  on
demographics, the  investment portfolio of  private funds  (which varies widely across
countries)  and the timing of maturation of funded schemes. Suppose  we assume a 'support
ratio' of 2, a desired  replacement  rate of pensions to lifetime average  earnings  of around 0.5,
and a wage bill share in GDP of 0.7, then pension assets of around 140 per cent of GDP at
scheme maturity would be required." 6 Only three countries in Table 3 are even close to
fulfiling this criterion: the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.  It is no
coincidence that  all these countries' public programmes have largely flat-rate pension
benefits. A further group of Anglo-Saxon  countries (North America, Ireland and Australia)
also have substantial private assets, followed by the Scandinavian  countries.  Few other
countries  among  this group have  private pension assets;  New Zealand being  the one country
where legislative  changes have eliminated  a substantial private industry (for further details,
see Stjohn, 1998  and Johnson, 1999).
16  This  assumes  that average  earnings  grow  in real  terms at 1% per annum,  and that the average  real
return  on the fund  as  it accumulates  is 5%  per annum.  The pension  is price  indexed  and  we abstract  from any
tax treatment  of income  or assets.  Out of interest,  to generate  a replacement  rate of 0.5 on average  lifetime
earnings  under  these  assumptions,  individuals  would  need  to save  just  under  9%  of their earnings  each  year  to
achieve  this target.
18Table  3.  Pension  fund assets as a percentage of GDP, 1987 and 1996
Country  1987  1996
Switzerland  75  117
Netherlands  46  87
United  Kingdom  62  75
United  States  36  58
Ireland  - 45
Canada  26  43
Japan  38  42
Finland  20  41
Average  27  33
Sweden  33  33
Australia  - 31
Denmark  11  24
Luxembourg  20  20
Greece  - 13
Portugal  - 10
Norway  4  7
Germany  3  6
France  - 6
Belgium  2  4
Spain  - 4
Korea  3  3
Italy  - 3
Austria  - 1
Czech  Republic  - 1
Hungary  - 0
Source:  OECD  (1998a),  TableV.1
Note:  Figures  for Denmark  include  company  pension  funds only  in 1996  and for Germany for 1993
and 1996 only.  Figures  for Finland cover financial assets only.  First pillar assets are
included  in Sweden  for 1987  and 1990. Average  calculated  over countries with both years'
data  only
Are  private  and  other  non-social  security  programmes  immune  from  the
demographic  transition? One problem is where supplementary  pension commitments over
and above the  explicit social security programme are unfunded.  In  particular, pension
schemes for public sector workers are often unfunded and, like other unfunded pension
liabilities,  not measured  explicitly  in the national  accounts. This is largely  true of the pension
schemes of civil servants in the United Kingdom, France and Germany, for  example
(Bovenberg  and Petersen, 1992). Efforts to measure  the liabilities  of public schemes  often
ignore  these additional  liabilities.
Second,  the future values  of private pension funds are subject to some of the same
pressures  that are likely  to affect public programmes. For example,  the maturation of these
19funds  will  accompany  the demographic  transition  resulting  from the baby  boom generation
reaching  retirement  age, and at that point funds will be net sellers,  rather than buyers  of
financial  assets. Whether  this affects  global  asset  values  depends  on the future path that
other countries  take in their  pension  arrangements  and the extent  to which  portfolios  are
globally  diversified.  At present,  a very small  proportion  of OECD pension  assets  are held
outside  the OECD area.  This leaves  open the possibility  of large gains from further
diversification  of pension  fund  portfolios.
Falling  or stagnant  asset values  would  make  it that much more difficult  for funded
pension  schemes  to provide  an adequate  value  of pensions.  However,  demographics  are not
fully synchronised  across countries, and  without further wholesale and  immediate
privatisation  by all  the OECD countries  simultaneously,  it is hard  to believe  that such  global
stagnation  of capital  market  values  will  take  place. A more  pressing  problem  in a number  of
countries  such  as the United  Kingdom,  is a recent  decline  in ainuty rates,  which  may  reflect
uncertainty  among  insurers  as to future  life expectancy,  imperfections  in capital  markets  and
the decline  in long  term  interest  rates.
A more general  issue is whether  there is positive  covariance  across  countries  and
time between  the rate of return in capital  markets  (which  determines  the payoff  of funded
schemes)  and  the implicit  potential  rate  of return  on unfunded  schemes  (which  is the rate  of
growth  of the wage  bill, or some similar  measure). If, for example,  falling  labour-force
growth is associated  with falling returns in the capital  market (perhaps  because of a
deepening  capital  stock),  then funded schemes  will not be immune  from the problems  of
existing,  unfunded,  schemes. Studies  which examine  the rdame insurance  properties  of
unfunded  schemes  versus  funded schemes  (such  as, recently,  Bohn,  1999)  do not focus  on
this  P.lio  issue.
Evidence  on this  latter  issue  is scanty.  Palacios  (1998)  suggests  that there  is  very  little
correlation  between  wage  growth and equity  returns over time. He examines  the period
from 1953-95  for Germany,  Japan, the United Kingdom  and the United States,  and a
somewhat  shorter  period  for Sweden,  and finds  coefficients  on a regression  of annual  wage
growth  on annual  equity  returns  of between  +0.047  and -0.01 for the different  countries.
None of these coefficients  are significant. This suggests  that diversification  out of an
unfunded  scheme  into some  combination  of funded  and  unfunded  schemes  should  improve
20the risk  properties  of the pension  system.  Indeed  if other assets  could  be found  that mimic
the return structure  implicit  in linking  part of the pension  scheme  to wage  growth,  a funded
component  (subject  to any  redistributive  aims)  might  seem  unnecessary.  These  results  are
interesting,  but cover rather short time periods  and a sub-set  of countries:  a full analysis
would  need  to look at the covariance  across  countries  as well as between  countries,  and
examine  portfolio  holdings.  Nevertheless,  the analysis  in this section  does  nothing  to refute
the proposition  that some  shift  towards  private  provision  might  guarantee  financial  security
relative  to the current  over-reliance  on unfunded  pension  programmes.
5.  A taxonomy  of pension reforms
It is now  useful  to consider  what is 'on the table'  in terms  of pension  reform  across
OECD countries. Rather  than proceed  on a country-by-country  basis  (see,  for example,
Johnson,  1999,  for such  an approach),  it is possible  to construct  a basic  typology  of such
reforn proposals.  A key  distinction  is obviously  between  proposals  that maintain  a strong
unfunded element,  and those that emphasise  the virtues of a transition  to  a funded
programme.  However  the 'funded  versus  unfunded'  debate  may  have  become  overwrought.
Mixed schemes  which contain funded and unfunded elements,  such as the  pension
programme  in the United  Kingdom,  may of course offer a plausible  'half way house'.
Indeed,  it is  hard  to find  a funded  proposal  that does  not contain,  at the very  least,  a residual,
publicly  financed  safety  net.  Similarly  even  the harshest  critic  of fully  funded  programmes
generally  accepts  that individuals  should  have  the right  to engage  in supplementary  saving
for retirement  in financial  assets if they so choose.  In similar  vein, a mixed  tier or
'multipillar'  approach  is central  to the pension  strategy  advocated  by  the World  Bank  (1994).
However,  the risk of mixed strategies  is that the pension  programme  becomes
excessively  complicated.  The United  Kingdom,  in which  individuals  can choose  in their
second  tier mandatory  provision  between  a public  pension  benefit  (the  state  earnings-related
pension, Serps),  a company-provided  occupational  pension,  or an individual  retirement
saving  account  (a 'personal  pension),  is a case  in point. Such  choice-based  systems  require  a
high degree  of transparency  and individual  knowledge  of pension  accrual  structures  (net of
transactions  costs)  if the risk  of people  choosing  unwisely  is to be avoided,  as the personal
21pension  'mis-selling' scandal has  illustrated.' 7 The  recent  pension  reform proposals
(Department of  Social Security, 1998) would  complicate the  choice still  further  by
introducing  a fourth route: the 'stakeholder  pension'. The complexity  engendered  by mixed
strategies  is illustrated  by the sylised chart (Figure 3) of what pension provision may look
like in  the  imrnediate future in  the  United  Kingdom if  the  current  proposals are
implemented  (see Disney,  Emmerson and Tanner, 1999  for further details).
Figure 3. The pension system in the United Kingdom
following  the 1998 reform
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In what follows,  four generic  reform strategies  are considered. The first two involve
retaining  a strong unfunded component. These are denoted a 'parametric'  reform strategy
(after Chand and Jaeger, 1996) and  a strategy based on  'actuarially  fair' public pension
programmes respectively.  The  second two strategies involve a  strong funded private
component and are denoted as a 'clean break' privatisation  and a 'partial' privatisation. In
the latter case,  where not all individuals  join the privatised  programme,  a key issue is whether
it is the government or individuals  themselves  that decide  who can join the private funded
scheme.
17  See  Whitehouse  (1998,  1999)  for  a discussion  of the mis-selling  issue.
225.1  A  paramtric'mrfom  of  the  u*xWprcgran
Chand and Jaeger denote a reform of this type as 'parametric'  because, presumably,
the key choice  variables  of an unfunded scheme can indeed be written down as a function of
a few 'parameters'. In the standard  approach  to financing  an unfunded pension programme,
define B = number of beneficiaries,  L  = number of workers, w = average  wage rate, p  =
average  pension and c = contribution  rate. Then, pay-as-you-go  equilibrium  requires  that c =
(B/L)(/w)  where (B/L)  is the  inverse of the  support ratio and  (plw) is the  average
replacement  rate.  Clearly to reduce c (or to avoid growing  debt if c is fixed by, say,  law at
below its equilibrium  level)  requires  any of, or a combination  of, reducing  p or B, or raising  w
or L.
Increasing  the support ratio requires  either reducing B or increasing  L.  Raising  the
state pensionable age and reducing entitlements  for dependants are ways of reducing B.
Raising  L requires  an increase in the economically  active  proportion of the population with
policies such as lower early retirement pensions and stricter regulation  of other 'routes' to
inactivity (e-g.  disability  benefits).  Reducing the replacement rate means either reducing
benefits directly or  indirectly by reducing the  generosity of post-retirement indexation
procedures,  or raising eligible  wages by for example  increasing  the fraction of the wage, or
the wage bill,  that is liable  to pay contributions.
Various simulations  of 'parametric' reforms of this type, for a number of OECD
countries,  have been carried out by international  organisations,  such as in Chand and Jaeger
(1996),  with a view to examining  their impact on fiscal  liabilities. They are (or should also
be) standard  in projections  carried out by official  actuaries  when estimating  the sensitivity  of
the future costs of pension programmes  to changes in baseline assumptions.  Most such
simulations find  that  the  key  parameter in  determining fiscal liabilities is  the  state
pensionable  age (often equated with the 'retirement  age' in such calculations). Raising  state
pensionable  age, or perhaps more specifically  linking  it explicitly  to  expected longevity,  is
23generally  a key policy  in 'parametric'  reforms  to the problem of financing  public  pension
programmes.  A number  of OECD countries  are  changing  pension  ages.' 8
Although these policies  are uncontroversial  from an economic  point of view
(although  rarely  so from a political  perspective),  the problem  lies in modelling  gains  from
them. A key  objection  to analyses  of the gains,  in terms  of the projected  reductions  in fiscal
liabilities,  is that retirement  behaviour  is rarely  modelled  explicitly  in such simulations  (as
indeed  in the equating  of 'retirement'  with the first age  of receipt  of benefits  from  the public
pension progranmme).  While raising state pensionable  age does indeed reduce the
denominator  of the support  ratio  directly,  the indirect  impact  on the number  of beneficiaries
is far from clear. Employment  (and even  participation)  rates  in the years  prior to reaching
state pensionable  age are well  below 100  per cent in most OECD countries,  and simply
raising  state  pensionable  age still  further  may  not necessarily  increase  participation  rates,  let
alone employment  rates,  among  older workers. If these extra  people below  pension  age
thereby  end up on unemployment  or disability  benefits,  or other forms  of welfare  support,
these  costs  will  offset  in budgetary  terms  the 'gain'  in the reduction  in the number  of explicit
beneficiaries  of the public  pension  programme. Estimates  of the benefits  of 'parametric'
reforms  which  do not model  these behavioural  effects  directly  are systematically  biased  in
favour  of finding  large  reductions  in fiscal  liabilities  from such reforms  precisely  because
they  treat  as parameters  what  are,  in fact,  behavioural  variables.
5.2  An  'a  fair`w'oai  p  xrne
A second  broad strategy  for reform  of an unfunded  programme,  which  leaves  the
financing  strategy  intact,  is to link benefits  and contributions  explicitly,  for each  generation,
to the Aaron-Samuelson  sustainable  'return'  to an unfunded  scheme. Such a strategy,  in
general  terms,  calculates  what is the sustainable  implicit  'rate  of return'  on the contributions
of each  cohort  of contributors.  This depends  on the projected  growth  or decline  in the real
contribution  base  (usually  proxied  by  the wage  bill). The accrual  rate  on pensions  is then  set
so that  this  return  is, on average,  realised.  This  policy  lies  behind  the so-called  'Dini  reform'
18  In the US,  the age  of full  entitlement  is to be raised  to 67  years  by  2020. Finland  Italy,  New  Zealand
and  Spain  are also  phasing-in  increases  in pensionable  age. Other countries,  such as Australia,  Germany  and
the United  Kingdom  are raising  women's  pension  age  to equalise  it with  men's. See  Disney  and Whitehouse
(1999a),  Table  5  and  OECD (1998a),  Figure  IV.1.
24of the Italian  programme  in the rnid-1990s,  and behind  the public  assertion  that such a
reform  puts  the programme  on an 'actuarially  fair'  basis.
Since  'actuarial  fairness'  also involves  questions  of redistribution  witbr generations,
or cohorts,  such a reform  has to include  subsidiary  but important  modifications  of plans:
towards,  for example,  an average  lifetime  basis  for calculating  pension  entitlements.  The
move  from a 'final'  or best  salary  basis  will  obviously  induce  some  variation  in outcomes  if
earnings  profiles  are subject  to volatility.' 9 At its logical'  extreme,  in the so-called  'notional
accounts'  variant  of this strategy,  each  individual  pension  is supposed  to be explicitly  based
on contributions  such as to minimise  inter-individual  variation  in returns. In the recent
Swedish  reform  and  in similar  reforms  elsewhere,  such  as Latvia  and Poland,  each  individual
is given  a 'notional  account'  within  the public  pension  programme.  This mimics  a funded
retirement  saving  account,  with  the important  difference,  of course,  that the accounts  are
'notional' (i.e.  not funded). With a linear accrual  structure,  the incremental  accrual  of
pension  benefits  should  be transparent. 20
Implicit  in a reform  of this type  is that the failures  of unfunded  programmes  up to
now arise  because  of their lack of transparency  and from their inability  to apply  a rigid
formula  linking  returns  to the Aaron-Samuelson  condition. These policies  would have
minimised  arbitrary  redistribution  arising  from the vagaries  of the benefit formula  and
political  processes,  it is argued. Since  this reform  strategy  is currently  rather fashionable,  a
few difficulties  need to be pointed out.  First, there are still no plausible  enforcement
mechanisms  to  guarantee  that the 'Aaron-Samuelson'  condition for equilibrium  in an
unfunded  programme  will be satisfied  in the future. In the Italian  reform,  much of the
generational  burden  of shifting  to this formula-based  approach  falls  on younger  generations.
There has been  a conspicuous  lack  of success  in the Italian  reform  in cutting  back  pension
benefits  in the immediate  future,  whereby  the burden  would  fall on prime age and older
generations.  In the Swedish  or Latvian-style  reform,  ingenious  adjustment  of the pension
indexation  formula  will  be used to keep  the fiscal  outcome  'on track'. Suppose,  however,
that a temporary  recession  reduces  real  wage  bill  growth  becomes  zero. Irrespective  of, say,
19  See the discussion  in Disney and Whitehouse  (1999a),  section 8.2.
20  See Fox and Palmer (1999)  on Latvia, Gora and Rutkowski (1998) on Poland, Palmer (1999)  and
Sunden (1999).
25inflation, nominal pensions will be  held constant.  Politically,  such an outcome seems
unlikely: even the  United Kingdom, with  its  low  level of  public pension provision,
automatically  indexes benefits to inflation. There is likely to be a ratchet effect by which,
when the wage bill rises faster than trend, pension are raised more rapidly but, where wage
bill growth falls below 'headline' indicators such as the rate of inflation,  pensions are raised
in line with inflation. As a result,  fiscal  liabilities  will continue to grow  relatively  rapidly.
Finally,  by attempting to elirninate  much of the redistribution  inherent in unfunded
schemes,  so as to make the benefit-contribution  link 'transparent',  much of the rationale for
the public programme is destroyed. Public  programmes inherently  redistribute  from poor to
rich (because  the poor die younger), from men to women, from married couples  to widows,
and from the rest to the very poorest through benefit 'floors'.  Moreover, participants can
automatically  compare explicit  'returns' to such accounts  with the much higher returns to be
obtained in marketed private savings  accounts. Will individuals  be willing  to contribute to a
programme which may well explicitly offer a negative return on  contributions to  later
generations 2'  while observing possible double digit nominal returns  on  private saving
accounts? It is not overly cynical  to suggest  that it is the lack of transparency of unfunded
public pension schemes, coupled with their undoubted insurance-based and redistributive
components, that  encourages people  to  contribute  to  such  programmes.  Greater
'transparency' only makes their inadequacies  more transparent, and the programmes less
attractive.
5.3  ICZ=-bLak'priin
The alternative  strategy  to 'fixing  up' the unfunded pension progranmme  is to replace
much of it with a  funded programme.  Such an approach has not  been implemented
explicitly  in OECD  countries.  The nearest variants are the introduction of mandatory
superannuation  in Australia in 1992, and the  1986 reform in the United Kingdom, which
downgraded SERPS and allowed  individuals  to  'opt out' of that scheme into an individual
retirement savings account known as a 'personal pension'.  The latter reform is however
more appropriately  considered  under the next sub-heading.
21  See, for example,  Hurd and Shoven (1985)  for an empirical  study of different cohort's returns from
social security  in the United States  and Disney and Whitehouse (1993)  on the United Kingdom.
26While  in principle  the government  can introduce  or extend  its own  managed  funded
component  to the public  programme,  a generic  transition  to a funded  programme  is almost
certain  to include  a private  component,  and thus I refer to this as 'privatisation'.  The big
objection  to allowing  the government  to organise  the funded  programme  itself  is that it is
extremely  difficult  to 'ring fence'  the public  pension  fund from other components  of the
government  budget. 22 Suppose,  for example,  as in the United  States,  that the assets  of the
public  pension  programme's  'trust fund' are held in the form of governnent  securities.
Insofar  as the purchase  of government  securities  by the fund permits  the government  to
increase  its own  liabilities  by, for example,  increasing  its spending  uncovered  by tax receipts,
then  the growth  of government  liabilities  matches  the growth  of government  assets  held  by
the fund. The funded  and unfunded  programmnes  are then equivalent  in their generational
incidence  (Kotlikoff,  1992).23  For this reason I consider  only a funded  option which  is
combimed  with privatisation.
The most  well  known  full scale  privatisation  of a public  pension  programme  is that
which  took place  in Chile  in November  1980  (see  Edwards  and Edwards,  1991;  Edwards,
1998),  which  has been copied  in a number of Latin  American  countries  and elsewhere. 24
Some  influential  commentators  are advocating  reforms  of this kind in OECD countries
(B6rsch-Supan,  1998a;  Feldstein,  1996,  1998).
The attractions  of full  funding  of the programme  are  as follows.  First,  the real  return
on funding  almost  always  exceeds  the 'Aaron-Samuelson'  return  on unfunded  schemes,  even
if one can argue  over the appropriate  private  rate of return to use. 25 Second,  a funded
scheme  is transparent,  not in the artificial  sense  of 'notional  accounts',  but in the real  sense
that benefits  are explicitly  related  to contributions  and capital  market  performance  rather
than to some  formula  of the public  programme.  In contrast,  contributions  to an unfunded
22  See  Iglesisas  and Palacios  (1999)  for a detailed  survey  of the performance  of publicly  mandaged
pension  assets.
23  This  is of course  a whole  sub-debate  in the  literature.  What  would  happen,  for  example,  if we  let  the
government  pension  fund  hold  equities  and  other  private  sector  assets?  This  would  imply  that  other  private
asset  holders  would  own  a greater  fraction  of  government  securities  while  the  governnent  would  hold  a greater
share  of the  equity  market.  The  effect  of this  on portfolio  values  depends  on  what  we  assume  about  financial
markets.  There  is also  the  rather  obvious  question  of  whether  the  governrnent  is  a better  fund  manager  than
the  private  sector.  Again,  see  Iglesias  and  Palacios  (1999)  on  this  last  issue.
24  See,  iralia, Queisser  (1998)  for  a survey  of  Latin  American  reforms.
25  For  example,  the  rate  should  account  for  transactions  costs  in establishing  funded  accounts,  net  out
the  risk  premnium  and  adjust  for  tax  liabilities.
27public  pension  programme  inevitably  contain  a tax component,  which  distorts  labour  supply
and savings  behaviour  relative  to  saving  in a funded programme. Note that this tax
distortion  has two dimensions.  First,  individuals  are forced  to buy  a given  level  of longevity
insurance  (pensions)  at an excessive  cost given  the low return to the unfunded  scheme.
Secondly,  the pattern of individual  benefits  implies  different  rates of return on individuals'
contributions  and thus there are arbitrary  transfers of income between contributors.
Feldstein  (1998,  'Introduction')  has estimated  the former  loss at 1 per cent of GDP in the
United  States,  which  is very large  relative  to most 'welfare  triangles'  calculated  in similar
exercises.
In a 'clean  break'  privatisation  of the pension  programme,  no further  contributions
are made  into the existing  unfunded  programme.  All new contributions  after  privatisation
are  made to the pension  funds  and are assigned  to individual  pension  accounts.  However,
the liabilities  of the unfunded programme,  which comprise  both existing  and projected
payments to current pensioners and the accrued pension rights of those who have not yet
retired within the unfunded programme,  have then to be financed by some means. This is
the crux of the funding transition problem:  the implicit  liabilities  of the existing  programme
then become explicit and are supplemented  by the additional liabilities  arising from the
transfer of all future contributions  to the new, funded, scheme. Of course, the assets of the
new funded programmes may match, or be less than or more than, the additional liabilities
arising  from the future cessation  of contributions  to the unfunded programme. As in Chile,
one of the main purchasers  of the extra liabilities  of the governnent may be the new pension
funds.  This offsets, at least partially, the  'extra' financing liability.  Nevertheless, the
immediate impact of privatisation is an explicit  jump in the liabilities  of the public sector
and, to those that do not like large  public sector liabilities,  such as the IMF, this issue seems
to be the insurmountable  hurdle of privatisation. 26
There are, however, several  ways of handling  the transition issue. One is simply  to
accept the extra explicit  burden of public  liabilities  and a higher perpetual  burden of interest
payments on the debt.  Chand and Jaeger (1996),  Table 18, estimate  the increase  in pension
liabilities  from this strategy  in a range of industrial  countries  to be on average  152  per cent of
26  Chand  andJaeger  (1996).  See  also  Holzrmann  (1998ab)  on the transition  issue.
281995 GDP.  Sixty  per cent of this increase  would arise  simply  from making explicit  existing
unfunded liabilities  that are not currently  covered  by legislated  contribution rate increases. It
would be possible,  in principle,  to model (heroically)  the implications  for real interest rates
under various assumptions.
The  second alternative is to  have an  explicit transition finance  strategy that
effectively involves establishing a generational incidence of the transition burden.  For
example, Kotlikoff (in Feldstein, 1998)  uses the Auerbach-Kotlikoff  (1987) GE model to
examine a transition to  full funding in the US economy.  He  adopts three transition-
financing scenarios:  lump sum transfers to compensate losing generations, an increase in
income tax rates or a new consumption (expenditure)  tax.  The last gives the strongest
aggregate  welfare gain in the model sirnulations. Another transition strategy, where the
generational  incidence is less clear, is where the liabilities  are in part financed by higher
budget surpluses  over a substantial  period. These are achieved  by, say, cutting public capital
spending or by privatisation  of public assets.  In the long run, the economy will have a
higher stock of private assets in the pension funds and a lower stock of public assets; the
welfare  consequences  of such a transition are more difficult  to evaluate  without knowledge
of the incidence  of the benefits  from publicly  owned assets.
Another common objection to  a funded solution is that it rules out  any explicit
redistribution as part of the public pension programme.  While elimination  of arbitrary
redistribution  may be desirable between generations,  it reduces the equity component of
such programmes  uitin  generations. A particular  problem  is that, in the face of transactions
costs, persistent  low-income  earners may be able only to earn very low pensions with their
contributions. An obvious solution is for the government  to provide a safety net or some
explicit  minimum  pension guarantee  within the funded programme. However, the costs of
the safety net have to  be added to  the fiscal liability  of the programme, and generous
guarantees  may encourage  low-income  contributors  to opt out (either formally,  if permitted,
or informally,  if the scheme is compulsory). Such non-participants  may reason that the
returns on their contributions,  less the deduction of the public guaranteed  payment that will
obtain if they can raise their pension by saving, make continued contribution to  the
programme unprofitable.  This is a trade-off that has to  be  evaluated explicitly  in the
privatisation  route.
29All OECD countries with a strong funded component to pension provision do in
fact supplement  private provision with a flat or income-tested  unfunded component. Chile
and other Latin American reforners  also have either a minimum pension guarantee or
social-assistance  top-ups for people with low incomes.  This combination of funded and
unfunded  components tends  to  emphasise the  redistributive impact  of  the  public
component, without  adversely  affecting  overall  pensioner  incomes. This finding  is illustrated
from research  using rnicro  data undertaken as part of the OECD's programmne  of work on
ageing. As Figure 4 shows (see also OECD, 1998,  Table IV.3),  ratios of average  pu  c  pesion
income to pre-retirement income vary widely across OECD countries but ratios of tota
pesion innre to pre-retirement  income are very similar.  In contrast, in the lowest quintile  of
the income distribution,  as the second panel of Figure 4 shows, the contribution of public
pension programmes  to retirement  incomes is very similar  across countries."
27  Figure  3 gives  the strong  implication  that comprehensive  public  provision  has crowded  out other,
private,  forms  of retirement  income. See  B6rsch-Supan  (1998)  for further  discussion.  It does not of course
follow  that  reductions  in  public  pension  benefits  would  automatically  generate  a private  pension  mnarket.
30Figure  4. Ratio  of pensioners'  incomes  to workers'  incomes
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A third argument  often  presented against funded  schemes  of this kind is that they
subject participants to investment risk.  I would rather restate this as suggesting that funding
replaces potential political risk with potential  investment  risk.  The  impact of political risk
should  not  be understated.  Table  4 shows  how  pension  benefits  have  been  affected by
recent  reforms  in  six major  OECD  countries.  Benefits  are  measured  by  'social  security
31wealth',  the net present  value  of the stream  of pension  payments. The calculations,  on a
common basis across countries, are for a 45 year old man on average  earnings.
2 8 In both
relative and absolute terms, the largest cut in benefits is from Italy's 'Amato' reforms of
1992. Before  the reform, social  security  wealth  was estimated  at 8.4 times average  earnings.
After the reform, this ratio was estimated  at 51/4  times, a cut of over three times earnings  or
38 per cent. The United Kingdom's two reforms of 1986  and 1994  cumulatively  cut benefits
by 27 per cent, a similar impact to the 1983 reform in the United States. Changes in the
other three countnres  have been rather smaller.  Post-reform social security benefits are
around 180 per cent of average earnings in the United Kingdom and 125 per cent in the
United States.  These are substantially  lower than other countries, as would be expected
from the data in Tables 1 and 2: over 400 in France and over 300 in Germany  and Japan.
Table 4.  Impact of pension reforms on social security wealth
Absolute  change  in  Percentage  change  in
social  securty  wealth social  security  wealth
(per  cent  of  eamings)
France  -assessment  period  10  to  25  years  -74  -14
(1993)  -post-retirement  indexation  wages  to  prices
Germany  -pension  age  63  to  65  -26  -7
(1992)  -post-retirement  indexation  gross  to  net  wages
Italy  -pension  age  from  60  to  65  -316  -38
(1992)  -assessment  period  5 to  10  years
-pre-retirement  indexation  wages  to  prices+1  %
-post-retirement  indexation  wages  to  prices
Japan  -first  tier  pension  age  60  to  65  -66  -15
(1994)  - post-retirement  indexation  wages  to  prices  for
second  ter
United  Kingdom  -assessment  period  20  years  to  working  life  -52  -23
(1986)  -replacement  rate  25  to  20%
United  Kingdom  -higher  flat-rate  deducton  from  eamings  for  -9  -5
(1994)  second  ter pension
United  States  -pension  age  65  to  67  -40  -25
(1983)  - some  taxabon  of  benefits
-one-off  indexation  pause
Note:  Changes  in pension  ages and social-security  wealth  data are for men.  Changes  for
women  are in almost  every  case larger because  of their longer  life expectancy.  Also  women's
pension  ages have  risen by more  than  men's  in Germany  and  will  increase  to match  men's  in the
United Kingdom
Source:  McHale  (1999),  Tables  5 and  6a
28  In fact,  the earnings  of the average  production  worker.  See  OECD  (1998b).
32Evaluating  the relative  importance of political,  investment  and other kinds of risk is
problematic.  It  can be argued, for example, that an explicit funded strategy allows the
individual  to dic5  risk: the observation  that equity markets are 'risky' is an irrelevance  to
the debate.  There are two key questions. First, whether, by adding a portfolio of market
assets to their pension 'portfolio', individuals  can thereby reduce the prospective 'riskiness'
attached to  their future pensions.  Secondly,  whether the market can provide types of
insurance against  annuity risk arising  from the volatility  of markets. Simply  asserting  that a
funded pension is  'risky' because it  may be  (in part) invested in  equities is erroneous
reasoning.
There are,  however,  more plausible  difficulties  associated  with investment  risk,  which
need, at the very least,  low cost technical  solutions. One is the process of annuitisation  itself,
which will imply  a change in the portfolio holding of the individual  as the accumulated  fund
is converted into an annuity stream.  If the point of conversion is simultaneous  with an
adverse outcome arising from market volatility,  the annuity stream will be of lower value.
However, deferral of annuitisation  in such circumstances  raises a real problem of adverse
selection. In general,  the annuity  market itself,  which may have been rather thin prior to the
decision to  privatise a  component of the pension programme, may have more general
adverse selection  problems and may need careful regulation. A large compulsory  arnnuity
market, however, might be expected to  reduce adverse selection problems relative to  a
voluntary market. 29 Finally, annuity rates will continue to fall as longevity increases,  and
especially  if there is greater  uncertainty  as to longevity  given  the potential impact  of medical
improvements  and improved  nursing care (see  the discussion  in section 3.4 above).
5.4  Partalpiwisatioz
A proposal that has gained attention more recently is to privatise the programme
partially. 'Partial'  in this context means not just the possibility  of maintaining  an unfunded
component to the programme as a whole: other possibilities  include only allowing  certain
individuals  to join the funded scheme, or alternatively  of allowing  individuals  the choice of
joining a funded or unfunded programme.  The latter, choice-based option is illustrated
29  Walliser  (1997,  1998)  explores  this  issue  from a theoretical  perspective.  Finelstein  and Poterba  (1999)
examine  the annuities  market  in the United  Kingdom,  and find  that the losses  from adverse  selection  in the
compulosry  part of the market  are  around  half  of the adverse-selection  cost  with  voluntary  annuities.
33among OECD countries by the United Kingdom, in which individuals  can choose to remain
in SERPS (the unfunded component of the programme) or to invest part of their national
insurance contribution in a personal pension."  An example of the former, cohort-based
option, is illustrated by 'basic pension plus'.  This scheme, proposed by the Conservative
administration ae'  the 1997 general election, would have replaced the basic state pension
with a funded programme for new cohorts entering  the labour market. Other countries  that
have used partial privatisations,  which either include a voluntary element, or a  cohort-
specific  transition, include  Argentina,  Hungary and Poland. 32
The essential point of such a reformn  is that it reduces  or spreads  the transition costs
more widely.  If onhl younger workers enter the funded programme (whether through
compulsion or choice), then they can obtain reasonable pensions on retirement by the
sirnple effect of  compound interest on their accumulating  fund.  At the same time, if
earnings  rise with age,  the initial  transition cost of their foregone  contributions  to the public
unfunded programme is low.  Over time, the value of foregone contributions rises but, of
course, the fiscal  liability  will  also peak. In contrast, in a 'clean  break' privatisation,  the cost
of  attempting to  replicate the  generosity of  the  'defined benefit' programme for  all
participants may involve an immediate large increase in financial liabilities,  as has been
shown previously.
A different problem emerges with partial privatisation  if there are large within-
generation  variations  in funded returns, for example  due to transactions  costs, or differences
in  individual entitlements in  the unfunded programme.  Suppose that  participation is
voluntary. It is possible, for example,  that al rich people within a cohort might opt to join
the private programme while all poorer people Qpted  to stay in the unfunded scheme. This
is more likely  if the unfunded programme contained various explicit  redistributive  elements
such as benefit ceilings  or non-linear  benefit accrual  rates  with income (the extreme  example
of which is a flat component to  benefits).  This generates a standard adverse selection
problem, and in  addition the existence of the funded option limits the capacity of the
30  Kotlikoff, Smetters and Waliser (1998)  and Gusnan  and Steineier  (1995)  look at the effects of
mandatory  and voluntary  participation  in private  pensions as a substitute for social  security  in the United States.
31  See Whitehouse (1998,  seaion Vi), Whitehouse and Wolf (1997)  and Department of Social Security
(1997)  for a description and analysis  on this proposal.
34unfunded scheme  to redistribute  within generations. On the other hand, allowing  only some
individuals to  join the funded scheme (differentiated,  for example, by age) may lead to
conflict, especially  if returns to  the funded scheme are well in  excess of  those to  the
unfunded scheme, making the funded option attractive  to a much wider group of people.
There is also the simple  point in voluntary  privatisations,  such as the United Kingdom, that
many people misunderstand  accrual  structures  and therefore make 'incorrect' choices.
6.  Conclusion
The  preceding discussion has suggested that  public pension programmes have
generated excessive  financial  liabilities  for a number of reasons, of which the ageing  of the
population is only one among several  reasons. There are a number of solutions  on offer but,
not  surprisingly,  they all have weaknesses. There are some obvious reforms that can be
carried out within existing  unfunded schemes, although a switch to a scheme of 'notional
accounts' would seem to be an unnecessary  complication  and, ultimately,  a dead end.  The
long run solution seems  to involve a strong funded element,  but the transition costs have to
be  handled  carefully and  partial strategies need  to  take  particular care  as  to  their
distributional  cornsequences  and potential  for complexity.
32  These  issues  are explored  in Disney,  Palacios  and Whitehouse  (1999)  and Palacios  and  Whitehouse
(1998).
35Table  Al. Estimates  of dependency  ratios, 1960-2030
Country  Elderly dependency  ratio  Total dependency  ratio  Needs-weighted  support ratio
1960  A60-90  1990  A90-30  2030  1960  z60-90  1990  A90-30  2030  1960  A60-90  1990  490-30  2030
United States  15.4  +3.7  19.1  +17.7  36.8  67.4  -15.7  51.7  +16.3  68.0  63.7  +4.0  67.7  -8.5  59.1
Japan  9.5  +7.6  17.1  +27.4  44.5  56.6  -13.1  43.5  +30.0  70.5  68.5  +2.6  71.1  -14.1  57.0
Germany  16.0  +5.7  21.7  +27.5  49.2  47.4  -2.1  45.3  +29.8  75.1  70.0  -0.8  69.2  -14.0  55.2
France  18.8  +2.0  20.8  +18.3  39.1  61.3  -10.2  51.1  +18.8  67.9  64.7  +2.8  67.5  -8.8  58.7
Italy  13.3  +8.3  21.6  +26.7  48.3  47.9  -2.4  45.5  +27.2  72.7  70.5  -1.4  69.1  -13.2  55.9
United Kingdom  17,9  +6.1  24.0  +14.7  38.7  53.7  -0.8  52.9  +15.1  68.0  67.3  -1.2  66.1  -7.4  58.7
Canada  13.0  +3.7  16.7  +22.4  39.1  70.5  -23.0  47.5  +21.5  69.0  63.3  +6.6  69.7  -11.3  58.4
Australia  13.9  +2.1  16.0  +17.0  33.0  63.2  -14.3  48.9  +13.7  62.6  65.3  +4.1  69.4  -8.2  61.2
Austria  18.6  +3.8  22.4  +21.6  44.0  52.1  -3.9  48.2  +23.2  71.4  67.7  +0.3  68.0  -9.0  57.0
Belgium  18.5  +3.9  22.4  +18.7  41.1  55.0  -5.8  49.2  +19.7  68.9  66.7  +1.0  67.7  -9.6  58.1
Denmark  16.5  +6.2  22.7  +15.0  37.7  55.8  -7.9  47.9  +19.1  67.0  67.0  +10  68.0  -8.8  59.2
Finland  11.7  +8.0  19.7  +21.4  41.1  60.6  -12.2  48.4  +22.5  70.9  66.6  +2.0  68.6  -11.0  57.6
Greece  12.3  +8.9  21.2  +19.7  40.9  52.0  -2.4  49.6  +16.9  66.3  69.3  -1.4  67.9  -9.2  58.7
Iceland  14.1  +2.5  16.6  +15.5  32.1  75.0  -19.8  55.2  +8.0  63.2  61.8  +5.4  67.2  -5.9  61.3
Ireland  18.6  -0.2  18.4  +6.9  25.3  70.6  -9.2  61.4  -6.9  54.5  62.1  +2.7  64.8  +0.5  65.3
Luxembourg  15.9  +4.0  19.9  +24.3  44.2  47.4  -2.6  44.8  +28.9  72.7  70.0  -0.2  69.8  -13.2  56.6
Netherlands  14.7  +4.4  19.1  +26.0  45.1  63.9  -19.4  44.5  +28.7  73.2  64.9  +5.4  70.2  -13.9  56.3
New Zealand  ..  ..  16.7  +13.8  30.5  ..  ..  50.9  +10.7  61.6  ..  ..  68.6  -6.5  62.1
Norway  17.3  +7.9  25.2  +13.5  38.7  58.2  -3.8  54.4  +13.9  68.3  66.1  -0.8  65.3  -6.6  58.7
Portugal  12.7  +6.8  19.5  +14.0  33.5  59.1  -8.4  50.7  +9.1  59.8  66.9  +1.0  67.9  -6.0  61.9
Spain  12.7  +7.1  19.8  +21.1  41.0  55.1  -5.8  49.3  +15.5  64.8  68.2  +0.1  68.3  -9.2  59.1
Sweden  17.8  +9.8  27.6  +11.8  39.4  51.8  -3.5  55.3  +15.1  70.4  68.0  -3.5  64.5  -6.5  58.0
Switzerland  15.5  +6.5  22.0  +26.6  48.6  51.5  -5.6  46.1  +309  77.0  68.7  +0.1  68.8  -13.9  54.9
Source:  Bos et a/. (1994)
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40Summary  Findings
Public pension programmes  in OECD countries  are in difficulties. With
ageing populations, and declining participation of working age men in
paid work, existing  pension  arrangements  are likely to be unsustainable
in the future in many of the richer OECD countries. Indeed, supporting
existing  pension  commitments, even  before  the 'baby boom' generation
reaches  retirement, has  already proved problematic in countries such
as  Italy.  Some  governments  have  already  taken  steps  to tackle  the pension
issue  but there is inevitably conflict over who will  bear the burden of
retrenchment:  will  it be current taxpayers,  current pensioners,  or future
generations  of taxpayers  and pensioners,  perhaps not yet born?
This paper considers  several issues. It examines  the evidence as
to whether public pension programmes  in some richer OECD countries
are indeed in need of major surgery,  focusing in particular on the issue
of fiscal sustainability. It then considers  why programmes  have  got into
financial difficulties. Consideration  of this issue  provides some clues as
to what type of reform process  is likely to be viable and credible. The
paper then examines  the strengths  and weaknesses  of some reform
strategies.  A central issue  considered  there  is  whether  pension  programmes
should be funded or unfunded.
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